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Journal of Finance Vol. 55 No. 5 2000

Crossing Networks and Dealer Markets: Competition and Performance

Terrence Hendershott1; Haim Mendelson2,3

1 University of Rochester · 2 Faculdades Guarulhos · 3 Stanford University

open access

Abstract

This paper studies the interaction between dealer markets and a relatively new form of exchange, passive crossing networks, where buyers and sellers trade directly with one another. We find that the crossing network is characterized by both positive (‘liquidity’) and negative (‘crowding’) externalities, and we analyze the effects of its introduction on the dealer market. Traders who use the dealer market as a ‘market of last resort’ can induce dealers to widen their spread and can lead to more efficient subsequent prices, but traders who only use the crossing network can provide a counterbalancing effect by reducing adverse selection and inventory holding costs.

DOI
10.1111/0022-1082.00281
Volume
55
Issue
5
Pages
2071-2115
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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