Journal of Finance Vol. 79 No. 2 2024
Auctions with Endogenous Initiation
Abstract
We study initiation of takeover auctions by potential buyers and the seller. A bidder's indication of interest reveals that she is optimistic about the target. If bidders' values have a substantial common component, as in takeover battles between financial bidders, this effect disincentivizes bidders from indicating interest, and auctions are seller‐initiated. Conversely, in private‐value auctions, such as battles between strategic bidders, equilibria can feature both seller‐ and bidder‐initiated auctions, with the likelihood of the latter decreasing in commonality of values and the probability of a forced sale by the seller. We also relate initiation to bids and auction outcomes.
- DOI
- 10.1111/jofi.13288
- Volume
- 79
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 1353-1403
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref