Journal of Finance Vol. 78 No. 4 2023
Competition and Misconduct
open access
Abstract
Misconduct is widespread. Practices such as misselling, pump and dump, and money laundering cause harm while raising profits. This paper presents a mechanism that can determine what sorts of misconduct can be sustained in competitive equilibrium in concentrated markets, oligopoly settings, and markets with many small competing firms. The model studied allows general demand and distinguishes types of ethical dilemma using current psychological understanding. The paper shows, for example, that markets with many small competing firms are not vulnerable to misconduct if firms respond to entry with niche strategies or if the ethical dilemma draws an emotional response.
- DOI
- 10.1111/jofi.13227
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 2277-2327
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref