Journal of Finance Vol. 74 No. 5 2019
Do Portfolio Manager Contracts Contract Portfolio Management?
Abstract
Most mutual fund managers have performance‐based contracts. Our theory predicts that mutual fund managers with asymmetric contracts and mid‐year performance close to their announced benchmark increase their portfolio risk in the second part of the year. As predicted by our theory, performance deviation from the benchmark decreases risk‐shifting only for managers with performance contracts. Deviation from the benchmark dominates incentives from the flow‐performance relation, suggesting that risk‐shifting is motivated more by management contracts than by a tournament to capture flows.
- DOI
- 10.1111/jofi.12823
- Volume
- 74
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 2543-2577
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref