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Journal of Finance Vol. 69 No. 6 2014

Strategic and Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions

Alexander S. Gorbenko1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8; Andrey Malenko2

1 Boston University · 2 National Research University Higher School of Economics · 3 Washington University in St. Louis · 4 University of Utah · 5 University of Rochester · 6 London Business School · 7 London School of Economics and Political Science · 8 Norwegian School of Economics

open access

Abstract

Using data on auctions of companies, we estimate valuations (maximum willingness to pay) of strategic and financial bidders from their bids. We find that a typical target is valued higher by strategic bidders. However, 22.4% of targets in our sample are valued higher by financial bidders. These are mature, poorly performing companies. We also find that (i) valuations of different strategic bidders are more dispersed and (ii) valuations of financial bidders are correlated with aggregate economic conditions. Our results suggest that different targets appeal to different types of bidders, rather than that strategic bidders always value targets more because of synergies.

DOI
10.1111/jofi.12194
Volume
69
Issue
6
Pages
2513-2555
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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