Journal of Finance Vol. 78 No. 2 2023
Information Aggregation via Contracting
open access
Abstract
When a group of investors with dispersed private information jointly invest in a risky project, how should they divide the project's profit? We show that a simple contract dividing profits in proportion to investors' risk tolerances may facilitate information aggregation by altering investors' risk‐taking incentives when they decide on how investment strategies respond to private information. Our results provide a contracting‐based approach for information aggregation, which is an alternative to learning from endogenous market variables (e.g., prices) via contingent schedules as seen in well‐known rational expectations equilibrium models.
- DOI
- 10.1111/jofi.13205
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 935-965
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref