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Journal of Finance Vol. 57 No. 4 2002

Explaining the Diversification Discount

José Manuel Campa; Simi Kedia1,2,3

1 Georgetown University · 2 Cornell University · 3 Light Prescriptions Innovators (Spain)

open access

Abstract

This paper argues that the documented discount on diversified firms is not per se evidence that diversification destroys value. Firms choose to diversify. We use three alternative econometric techniques to control for the endogeneity of the diversification decision, and find evidence supporting the selfselection of diversifying firms. We find a strong negative correlation between a firms choice to diversify and firm value. The diversification discount always drops, and sometimes turns into a premium. There also exists evidence of selfselection by refocusing firms. These results point to the importance of explicitly modeling the endogeneity of the diversification status in analyzing its effect on firm value.

DOI
10.1111/1540-6261.00476
Volume
57
Issue
4
Pages
1731-1762
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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