Journal of Finance Vol. 79 No. 5 2024
Founder‐CEO Compensation and Selection into Venture Capital‐Backed Entrepreneurship
Abstract
We show theoretically that a critical determinant of the attractiveness of venture capital (VC)‐backed entrepreneurship for high‐earning potential founders is the expected time to develop a startup's initial product. This is because founder‐CEOs' cash compensation increases substantially after product development, alleviating the nondiversifiable risk that founders face at startup birth. Consistent with the model's predictions of where the supply of entrepreneurial talent is likely to be most constrained, we find that technological shocks differentially altering the expected time to product across industries can explain changes in both the rate of entry and characteristics of individuals selecting into VC‐backed entrepreneurship.
- DOI
- 10.1111/jofi.13383
- Volume
- 79
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 3361-3405
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref