Journal of Finance Vol. 72 No. 5 2017
Firm Investment and Stakeholder Choices: A Top‐Down Theory of Capital Budgeting
Abstract
This paper develops a top‐down model of capital budgeting in which privately informed executives make investment choices that convey information to the firm's stakeholders (e.g., employees). Favorable information in this setting encourages stakeholders to take actions that positively contribute to the firm's success (e.g., employees work harder). Within this framework we examine how firms may distort their investment choices to influence the information conveyed to stakeholders and show that investment rigidities and overinvestment can arise as optimal investment distortions. We also examine investment distortions in multi‐divisional firms and compare such distortions to those in single‐division firms.
- DOI
- 10.1111/jofi.12526
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 2179-2228
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex