Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 110 No. 3 1995
Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits
open access
Abstract
This paper analyzes the behavior of U. S. governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation-building model of political behavior. We argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model. We find evidence that taxes, spending, and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a Democrat is in office. The result is a fiscal cycle in term-limit states, which lowers state income when the term limit binds.
- DOI
- 10.2307/2946699
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 769-798
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref