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Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 123 No. 4 2008

Competing with the New York Stock Exchange*

William O. Brown1; J. Harold Mulherin2; Marc Weidenmier3

1 University of North Carolina at Greensboro · 2 University of Georgia · 3 Claremont McKenna College

Abstract

Research on information economics and securities markets dating back to Stigler (Journal of Political Economy, 69 (1961), 213–225; Journal of Business, 37 (1964), 117–142) argues that trading will tend to centralize in major market centers such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The NYSE's recent mergers with Archipelago and Euronext bring questions about the viability and effects of competition between stock exchanges to the policy forefront. We examine the largely forgotten but unparalleled episode of competition between the NYSE and the Consolidated Stock Exchange of New York (Consolidated) from 1885 to 1926. The Consolidated averaged 23% of NYSE volume for approximately forty years by operating a second market for the most liquid securities that traded on the Big Board. Our results suggest that NYSE bid-ask spreads fell by more than 10% when the Consolidated began to trade NYSE stocks and subsequently increased when the Consolidated ceased operations. The empirical analysis suggests that this historical episode of stock market competition improved consumer welfare by an amount equivalent to US$9.6 billion today.

DOI
10.1162/qjec.2008.123.4.1679
Volume
123
Issue
4
Pages
1679-1719
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib

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