Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 109 No. 4 1994
The Management of Innovation
open access
Abstract
The paper analyzes the organization of the R&D activity in an incomplete contract framework. It provides theoretical foundations: (a) to understand how the allocation of property rights on innovations may affect both the frequency and the magnitude of these innovations; (b) to rationalize commonly observed features in research employment contracts, such as shop rights, trailer clauses, and the "hired for" doctrine; (c) to discuss the robustness of the so-called Schumpeterian hypotheses to endogenizing the organization of R&D; and (d) to provide a rationale for cofinancing arrangements in research activities.
- DOI
- 10.2307/2118360
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1185-1209
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref