Thy Neighbor's Keeper: The Design of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test

Abhijit Banerjee; T. Besley; Timothy W. Guinnane

doi:10.2307/2118471

Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 109 No. 2 1994

Thy Neighbor's Keeper: The Design of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test

Abhijit Banerjee¹; T. Besley^2,3; Timothy W. Guinnane⁴

¹ Massachusetts Institute of Technology · ² Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars · ³ Princeton University · ⁴ Yale University

Abstract

Economists now appreciate that resource allocation in less economically developed economies is profoundly influenced by nonfirm economic institutions. However, our theories of nonfirm institutions often suggest different answers to many questions including those of policy. This paper illustrates a method for discriminating between alternative theories using data from German credit cooperatives from nineteenth and early twentieth century Germany. We build a model of credit cooperatives designed to provide monitoring incentives and test this using nineteenth century data.

DOI: 10.2307/2118471
Volume: 109
Issue: 2
Pages: 491-515
Language: en
Sources: bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Thy Neighbor's Keeper: The Design of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test

Abstract

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