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Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 110 No. 1 1995

Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning

Glenn Ellison1; Drew Fudenberg2

1 Massachusetts Institute of Technology · 2 Harvard University Press

open access

Abstract

This paper studies the way that word-of-mouth communication aggregates the information of individual agents. We find that the structure of the communication process determines whether all agents end up making identical choices, with less communication making this conformity more likely. Despite the players' naive decision rules and the stochastic decision environment, word-of-mouth communication may lead all players to adopt the action that is on average superior. These socially efficient outcomes tend to occur when each agent samples only a few others.

DOI
10.2307/2118512
Volume
110
Issue
1
Pages
93-125
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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