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Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 114 No. 4 1999

A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms

Robert Gibbons1; Michael Waldman2

1 Massachusetts Institute of Technology · 2 Cornell University

Abstract

We show that a framework that integrates job assignment, human-capital acquisition, and learning captures several empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms, including the following. First, real-wage decreases are not rare but demotions are. Second, wage increases are serially correlated. Third, promotions are associated with large wage increases. Fourth, wage increases at promotion are small relative to the difference between average wages across levels of the job ladder. Fifth, workers who receive large wage increases early in their stay at one level of the job ladder are promoted quickly to the next.

DOI
10.1162/003355399556287
Volume
114
Issue
4
Pages
1321-1358
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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