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Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 112 No. 4 1997

The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons

Oliver Hart1; A SHLEIFER1; Robert W. Vishny2

1 Harvard University Press · 2 University of Chicago

open access

Abstract

When should a government provide a service in-house, and when should it contract out provision? We develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost. If contracts are incomplete, the private provider has a stronger incentive to engage in both quality improvement and cost reduction than a government employee has. However, the private contractor's incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong because he ignores the adverse effect on noncontractible quality. The model is applied to understanding the costs and benefits of prison privatization.

DOI
10.1162/003355300555448
Volume
112
Issue
4
Pages
1127-1161
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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