Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 112 No. 3 1997
Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm
Abstract
We propose that dispersed outside ownership and the resulting managerial discretion come with costs but also with benefits. Even when tight control by shareholders is ex post efficient, it constitutes ex ante an expropriation threat that reduces managerial initiative and noncontractible investments. In addition, we show that equity implements state contingent control, a feature usually associated with debt. Finally, we demonstrate that monitoring, and hence ownership concentration, may conflict with performance-based incentive schemes.
- DOI
- 10.1162/003355397555325
- Volume
- 112
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 693-728
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex