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Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 121 No. 3 2006

Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance*

Alexandre Mas

University of California, Berkeley

Abstract

Several theories suggest that pay raises below a reference point will reduce job performance. Final offer arbitration for police unions provides a unique opportunity to examine these theories, as the police officers either receive their requested wage or receive a lower one. In the months after New Jersey police officers lose in arbitration, arrest rates and average sentence length decline, and crime reports rise relative to when they win. These declines in performance are larger when the awarded wage is further from the police union's demand. The findings support the idea that considerations of fairness, disappointment, and, more generally, reference points affect workplace behavior.

DOI
10.1162/qjec.121.3.783
Volume
121
Issue
3
Pages
783-821
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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