Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 117 No. 2 2002
A Theory of Insidious Regionalism
open access
Abstract
This paper presents an interpretation of rising regionalism in world trade as a coordination failure, based on (i) sector-specific sunk costs in production, and (ii) "friction" in trade negotiation. Given these elements, if a regional trade bloc is expected to form, private agents will make investments that will make bloc member countries more specialized toward each other, but bloc and nonbloc countries mutually less specialized. This diminishes the ex post demand for multilateral free trade. Thus, the expected supply of regionalism generates its own demand, creating a Pareto-inferior equilibrium.
- DOI
- 10.1162/003355302753650337
- Volume
- 117
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 571-608
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref