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The Review of Corporate Finance Studies Vol. 10 No. 4 2021

Private Equity and the Resolution of Financial Distress

Edith Hotchkiss1; David C. Smith2; Per Strömberg3

1 Carroll School of Management, Boston College · 2 McIntire School of Commerce University of Virginia · 3 Stockholm School of Economics, Swedish House of Finance, CEPR, and ECGI

Abstract

We examine the role private equity (PE) sponsors play in the resolution of financial distress of portfolio companies. PE-backed firms have higher leverage and default at higher rates than other companies borrowing in leveraged loan markets. But, PE-backed firms restructure more quickly, avoid bankruptcy court more often, and liquidate less often compared to other highly leveraged firms experiencing financial distress. PE owners are also more likely to retain control post-restructuring, often by infusing capital as firms approach distress. While default frequencies are higher among PE-backed firms, PE investors appear to manage financial distress at lower cost compared to other owners.

DOI
10.1093/rcfs/cfab015
Volume
10
Issue
4
Pages
694-747
Language
en
Sources
openalex openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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