Review of Economic Studies Vol. 55 No. 1 1988
Security Equilibrium
Abstract
This paper presents a technique for demonstrating the existence of a un ique equilibrium that is applicable to a variety of models in which t he price at which goods are traded in a market is determined by pairw ise bargaining between individual buyers and sellers who are brought together by some matching process. The results are framed in terms of a new equilibrium no-tion: in a security equilibrium, no player will settle for a payoff, under any contingency, which is less than his s ecurity level given the occurrence of that contingency. The technique is applied in detail to a generalization of a model of A. Rubinstein and A. Wolinsky (1985).
- DOI
- 10.2307/2297528
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 33
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex