Review of Economic Studies Vol. 84 No. 2 2016

Optimal Voting Rules

Alex Gershkov^1,2; Benny Moldovanu³; Xianwen Shi⁴

¹ Hebrew University of Jerusalem · ² University of Surrey · ³ University of Bonn · ⁴ University of Toronto

Abstract

We derive the incentive compatible and ex-ante welfare maximizing (i.e. utilitarian) mechanism for settings with an arbitrary number of agents and alternatives where the privately informed agents have single-crossing and single-peaked preferences. The optimal outcome can be implemented by modifying a sequential voting scheme that is used in many legislatures and committees. The modification uses a flexible majority threshold for each of several alternatives, and allows us to replicate, via a single sequential procedure, the entire class of anonymous, unanimous, and dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms. Our analysis relies on elegant characterizations of this class of mechanisms for single-peaked and single-crossing preferences.

DOI

10.1093/restud/rdw044

Volume

84

Issue

2

Pages

rdw044

Language

en

Sources

openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib

Cite

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