Review of Economic Studies Vol. 53 No. 3 1986

Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design

Jerry R. Green^1,2; Jean-Jacques Laffont²

¹ Harvard University Press · ² École des hautes études en sciences sociales

Abstract

In a principal-agent model with adverse selection, we study the implementation of social choice functions when the agent's message space is a correspondence which depends on this true characteristic. We characterize such correspondence for which the Revelation Principle is valid.

DOI

10.2307/2297639

Volume

53

Issue

3

Pages

447

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

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