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Review of Economic Studies Vol. 88 No. 2 2021

Multiple Equilibria in Open Economies with Collateral Constraints

Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé1; Martín Uribe2

1 Columbia University, CEPR, and NBER · 2 Columbia University and NBER

Abstract

This article establishes the existence of multiple equilibria in infinite-horizon open economy models in which the value of tradable and non-tradable endowments serves as collateral. In this environment, the economy displays self-fulfilling financial crises in which pessimistic views about the value of collateral induce agents to deleverage. Under plausible calibrations, there exist equilibria with underborrowing. This result stands in contrast to the overborrowing result stressed in the related literature. Underborrowing emerges in the present context because in economies that are prone to self-fulfilling financial crises, individual agents engage in excessive precautionary savings as a way to self-insure.

DOI
10.1093/restud/rdaa023
Volume
88
Issue
2
Pages
969-1001
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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