Review of Economic Studies Vol. 92 No. 2 2025
Signalling with Private Monitoring
Abstract
We study dynamic signalling when the sender does not see the signals that her actions generate. The sender then uses her past play to forecast what a receiver believes, in turn forcing the receiver to forecast the previous forecast, and so forth. We identify a class of linear-quadratic-Gaussian games where this endogenous higher-order uncertainty can be handled. The sender’s second-order belief is key: it is a private state that she controls, and it creates a new channel for information transmission. We examine the role of higher-order uncertainty and this new signalling channel in applications to macroeconomics, reputation, and trading: inflationary biases under discretion can be larger; career-concerned agents may benefit from not knowing their reputations; and informed trades can carry more price impact. We also introduce an existence method for boundary value problems that can be used in other dynamic games.
- DOI
- 10.1093/restud/rdae035
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 909-953
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref