Review of Economic Studies Vol. 66 No. 1 1999

Implementation and Renegotiation

Eric Maskin¹; John Moore^2,3

¹ Harvard University Press · ² University of St Andrews · ³ London School of Economics and Political Science

Abstract

The paper characterizes the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism.

DOI

10.1111/1467-937x.00077

Volume

66

Issue

1

Pages

39-56

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

APA 7 MLA 9 Chicago (author–date) Harvard Elsevier Harvard (JFE, JBF…) The Accounting Review Academy of Management American Marketing Association INFORMS (Management Science) Copy citation Copied ✓