Review of Economic Studies Vol. 63 No. 2 1996

Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

Gene M. Grossman^1,2,3; Elhanan Helpman^1,3

¹ Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars · ² National Bureau of Economic Research · ³ Princeton University

Abstract

We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a legislature. The parties have fixed positions on some issues, but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions. In this context, we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving, and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms. We show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups. The party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests.

DOI

10.2307/2297852

Volume

63

Issue

2

Pages

265

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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