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Review of Economic Studies Vol. 57 No. 3 1990

Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations

Raquel Fernández; Robert W. Rosenthal1

1 Boston University

open access

Abstract

The sovereign-debt literature has often implicitly assumed that all the power in the bargaining game between debtor and creditor lies with the latter. This paper explores that assumption by analyzing three game-theoretic models of debt renegotiations. In two of the models, both of which are built on the traditional one-sector growth model, all the subgame-perfect equilibria have an extreme form in which the game's surplus is captured by the creditor. The third game has many subgame-perfect equilibria that do not have this feature, however. The roles of various assumptions in all three games are examined.

DOI
10.2307/2298017
Volume
57
Issue
3
Pages
331
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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