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Review of Economic Studies Vol. 72 No. 4 2005

Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis

Simon P. Anderson1; Stephen Coate2

1 University of Virginia · 2 Cornell University

Abstract

This paper presents a theory of the market provision of broadcasting and uses it to address the nature of market failure in the industry. Equilibrium advertising levels may be too low or too high, depending on the nuisance cost to viewers, the substitutability of programmes, and the expected benefits to advertisers from contacting viewers. The equilibrium amount of programming may also be below or above the socially optimal level. Perhaps surprisingly, the ability to price programming may reduce social surplus, while monopoly ownership may increase it.

DOI
10.1111/0034-6527.00357
Volume
72
Issue
4
Pages
947-972
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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