Review of Economic Studies Vol. 73 No. 4 2006
Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions
Abstract
In two-sided multi-unit auctions having a variety of payment rules, including uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium (MPSE) exists when bidders are risk neutral with independent multi-dimensional types and interdependent values. In fact, all mixed-strategy equilibria are ex post allocation and interim expected payment equivalent to MPSE. Thus, for standard expected surplus/revenue analysis, there is no loss restricting attention to monotone strategies.
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00407.x
- Volume
- 73
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1039-1056
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex