Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents

Yeon‐Koo Che; I. Gale; Jae Bum Kim

doi:10.1093/restud/rds025

← Search

Review of Economic Studies Vol. 80 No. 1 2013

Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents

Yeon‐Koo Che¹; I. Gale²; Jae Bum Kim³

¹ Columbia University · ² Georgetown University · ³ Seoul National University

Abstract

This article studies different methods of assigning a good to budget-constrained agents. Schemes that assign the good randomly and allow resale may outperform the competitive market in terms of Utilitarian efficiency. The socially optimal mechanism involves random assignment at a discount—an in-kind subsidy—and a cash incentive to discourage low-valuation individuals from claiming the good.

DOI: 10.1093/restud/rds025
Volume: 80
Issue: 1
Pages: 73-107
Language: en
Sources: bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents

Abstract

Cite