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Review of Economic Studies Vol. 77 No. 1 2010

Competitive Non-linear Pricing and Bundling

Mark Armstrong1,2; John Vickers3

1 UCL Australia · 2 University College London · 3 University of Oxford

open access

Abstract

We examine competitive non-linear pricing in a model in which consumers have heterogeneous and elastic demands and can buy from more than one supplier. It is an equilibrium for firms to offer a menu of efficient two-part tariffs, where the discount for one-stop shopping is such that the elasticity of “demand for two-stop shopping” equals two. Compared with linear pricing, non-linear pricing tends to raise profit but harm consumers when: (i) demand is elastic, (ii) there is heterogeneity in consumer demand, (iii) consumers incur shopping costs when buying from more than one firm, and (iv) a consumer's brand preference for one product is correlated with her brand preference for another product. Non-linear pricing is more likely to lead to welfare gains when (iii) and (iv) hold, but (ii) does not.

DOI
10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00562.x
Volume
77
Issue
1
Pages
30-60
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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