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Review of Economic Studies Vol. 64 No. 1 1997

Countably Additive Subjective Probabilities

Maxwell B. Stinchcombe

The University of Texas at Austin

Abstract

The subjective probabilities implied by Savage's (1954, 1972) Postulates are finitely but not countably additive. The failure of countable additivity leads to two known classes of dominance paradoxes, money pumps and indifference between an act and one that pointwise dominates it. There is a common resolution to these classes of paradoxes and to any others that might arise from failures of countably additivity. It consists of reinterpreting finitely additive probabilities as the "traces" of countably additive probabilities on larger state spaces. The new and larger state spaces preserve the essential decision-theoretic structures of the original spaces.

DOI
10.2307/2971743
Volume
64
Issue
1
Pages
125
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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