← Search

Review of Economic Studies Vol. 69 No. 1 2002

Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies

Ethan Ligon1,2; Jonathan P. Thomas3; Tim Worrall4

1 A.P. Giannini Foundation · 2 University of California, Berkeley · 3 University of St Andrews · 4 Keele University

Abstract

Recent work on consumption allocations in village economies finds that idiosyncratic variation in consumption is systematically related to idiosyncratic variation in income, thus rejecting the hypothesis of full risk-pooling. We attempt to explain these observations by adding limited commitment as an impediment to risk-pooling. We provide a general dynamic model and completely characterise efficient informal insurance arrangements constrained by limited commitment, and test the model using data from three Indian villages. We find that the model can fully explain the dynamic response of consumption to income, but that it fails to explain the distribution of consumption across households.

DOI
10.1111/1467-937x.00204
Volume
69
Issue
1
Pages
209-244
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite