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Review of Economic Studies Vol. 90 No. 5 2023

Optimal Feedback in Contests

Jeffrey C. Ely1; George Georgiadis1; Sina Khorasani2; Luis Rayo1

1 Northwestern University · 2 University of Dayton

Abstract

We obtain optimal dynamic contests for environments where the designer monitors effort through coarse, binary signals—Poisson successes—and aims to elicit maximum effort, ideally in the least amount of time possible, given a fixed prize. The designer has a vast set of contests to choose from, featuring termination and prize-allocation rules together with real-time feedback for the contestants. Every effort-maximizing contest (which also maximizes total expected successes) has a history-dependent termination rule, a feedback policy that keeps agents fully apprised of their own success, and a prize-allocation rule that grants them, in expectation, a time-invariant share of the prize if they succeed. Any contest that achieves this effort in the shortest possible time must in addition be what we call second chance: once a pre-specified number of successes arrive, the contest enters a countdown phase where contestants are given one last chance to succeed.

DOI
10.1093/restud/rdac074
Volume
90
Issue
5
Pages
2370-2394
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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