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Review of Economic Studies Vol. 85 No. 3 2018

Disclosure and Choice

Elchanan Ben-Porath1; Eddie Dekel2; Barton L. Lipman3

1 Hebrew University · 2 Northwestern University, and Tel Aviv University · 3 Boston University

Abstract

An agent chooses among projects with random outcomes. His payoff is increasing in the outcome and in an observer's expectation of the outcome. With some probability, the agent can disclose the true outcome to the observer. We show that choice is inefficient: the agent favors riskier projects even with lower expected returns. If information can be disclosed by a challenger who prefers lower beliefs of the observer, the chosen project is excessively risky when the agent has better access to information, excessively risk{averse when the challenger has better access, and efficient otherwise. We also characterize the agent's worst-case equilibrium payoff.

DOI
10.1093/restud/rdx064
Volume
85
Issue
3
Pages
1471-1501
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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