Review of Economic Studies Vol. 83 No. 3 2016
Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
Abstract
Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This article explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and the quality of policy outcomes. We show formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple singlemember districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates. Results from a unique field experiment in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Specifically, representatives selected by elections with a single multi-member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences.
- DOI
- 10.1093/restud/rdw018
- Volume
- 83
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 932-968
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref