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Review of Economic Studies Vol. 74 No. 1 2007

Costly Signalling in Auctions

Johannes Hörner1; Nicolas Sahuguet2

1 Northwestern University · 2 HEC Montréal

Abstract

This paper analyses a dynamic auction in which a fraction of each bid is sunk. Jump bidding is used by bidders to signal their private information. Bluffing (respectively sandbagging) occurs when a weak (respectively strong) player seeks to deceive his opponent into thinking that he is strong (respectively weak). A player with a moderate valuation bluffs by making a high bid and drops out if his bluff is called. A player with a high valuation should vary his bids and should sometimes sandbag by bidding low, to induce lower bids by his rival.

DOI
10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00418.x
Volume
74
Issue
1
Pages
173-206
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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