Review of Economic Studies Vol. 70 No. 3 2003
Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations
Abstract
This paper looks at the incentives of individual members of a monetary policy committee to gain a reputation for inflationary toughness. I show a policy maker can have more or less incentive to build a reputation when part of a group. But, group policy making leads to higher expected social welfare. Not publishing individuals’ votes, raises the temptation to inflate and lowers expected social welfare. If the culture or rules of a central bank puts more weight on senior policy makers, the incentive to build a reputation is greater, but expected social welfare may be higher or lower.
- DOI
- 10.1111/1467-937x.00260
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 649-665
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref