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The Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 106 No. 5 2024

Legal Protection against Retaliatory Firing Improves Workplace Safety

Matthew S. Johnson1; Daniel Schwab2; Patrick Koval3

1 Duke University · 2 College of the Holy Cross · 3 Boston University

Abstract

Workplace safety policies are designed to ensure that employers internalize the costs of injuries, but employers can undermine these policies with threats of dismissal. We show that states’ adoption of the public policy exception to at-will employment—an exception forbidding employers from firing workers for filing workers’ compensation claims or for whistleblowing—led to a substantial reduction in injuries. The widespread adoption of the public policy exception explains 14% of the decline in fatal injury rates between 1979 and 1994. Statutory protections from retaliatory firing also improved safety, but only when employers faced sufficiently strong penalties for violating them.

DOI
10.1162/rest_a_01225
Volume
106
Issue
5
Pages
1236-1253
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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