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The Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 105 No. 1 2023

Fiscal Incentives for Conflict: Evidence from India's Red Corridor

Jacob N. Shapiro1; Oliver Vanden Eynde2

1 Princeton University · 2 Paris School of Economics and CNRS

open access

Abstract

Can tax regimes shape the incentives to engage in armed conflict? Indian mining royalties benefit the states but are set by the central government. India's Maoist belt is mineral rich, and states are responsible for counterinsurgency operations. We exploit the introduction of a 10% ad valorem tax on iron ore that increased royalty collections of the affected states by a factor of 10. We find that the royalty hike was followed by a significant intensification of violence in districts with important iron ore deposits. The royalty increase was also followed by an increase in illegal mining activity in iron mines.

DOI
10.1162/rest_a_01039
Volume
105
Issue
1
Pages
217-225
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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