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The Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 106 No. 6 2024

Regulated Revenues and Hospital Behavior: Evidence from a Medicare Overhaul

Tal Gross1; Adam Sacarny2; Maggie Shi3; David Silver4

1 Boston University and NBER · 2 Columbia University and NBER · 3 University of Chicago and NBER · 4 University of California, Santa Barbara and NBER

Abstract

We study a 2008 policy reform in which Medicare revised its hospital payment system to better reflect patients’ severity of illness. We construct a simulated instrument that predicts a hospital’s policy-induced change in reimbursement using pre-reform patients and postreform rules. The reform led to large persistent changes in Medicare payment rates across hospitals. Hospitals that faced larger gains in Medicare reimbursement increased the volume of Medicare patients they treated. The estimates imply a volume elasticity of 1.2. To accommodate greater volume, hospitals increased nurse employment, but also lowered length of stay.

DOI
10.1162/rest_a_01254
Volume
106
Issue
6
Pages
1709-1718
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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