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The Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 107 No. 1 2025

Getting the Price Right? The Impact of Competitive Bidding in the Medicare Program

Hui Ding1; Mark Duggan2; Amanda Starc3

1 Fudan University · 2 Stanford University and NBER · 3 Northwestern University and NBER

Abstract

We study Medicare’s competitive bidding program for durable medical equipment. We use Medicare claims data to examine the effect on prices and utilization, focusing on continuous positive airway pressure devices for sleep apnea. We find that spending falls by 47.2% after a highly imperfect bidding mechanism is introduced. This is almost entirely driven by a 44.8% price reduction, though quantities also fall by 4.3%. To disentangle supply and demand, we leverage differential cost sharing across Medicare recipients. We measure a demand elasticity of -0.272 and find that quantity reductions are concentrated among less clinically appropriate groups.

DOI
10.1162/rest_a_01249
Volume
107
Issue
1
Pages
204-220
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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