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Review of Financial Studies Vol. 33 No. 4 2020

Contracting on Credit Ratings: Adding Value to Public Information

Christine A. Parlour1; Uday Rajan2

1 Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley · 2 Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan

Abstract

We consider the role of credit ratings when contracts between investors and portfolio managers are incomplete. In our model, a credit rating and a price on a risky bond both provide verifiable signals about a non-contractible state. We allow the investor to both impose ex ante restrictions on the manager’s action and provide outcome-based compensation. The optimal contract is a prohibitive one when the rating and price indicate a high likelihood of a low state, and relies on wages when the low state is less likely. We provide some observable implications of our contracting approach to ratings.

DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhz083
Volume
33
Issue
4
Pages
1412-1444
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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