Review of Financial Studies Vol. 33 No. 4 2020
Contracting on Credit Ratings: Adding Value to Public Information
Abstract
We consider the role of credit ratings when contracts between investors and portfolio managers are incomplete. In our model, a credit rating and a price on a risky bond both provide verifiable signals about a non-contractible state. We allow the investor to both impose ex ante restrictions on the manager’s action and provide outcome-based compensation. The optimal contract is a prohibitive one when the rating and price indicate a high likelihood of a low state, and relies on wages when the low state is less likely. We provide some observable implications of our contracting approach to ratings.
- DOI
- 10.1093/rfs/hhz083
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1412-1444
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref