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Review of Financial Studies Vol. 38 No. 5 2025

Financing Infrastructure in the Shadow of Expropriation

Viral V. Acharya1; Cecilia Parlatore2; Suresh Sundaresan3

1 Stern School of Business, New York University and NBER, United States and CEPR and ECGI · 2 Stern School of Business, New York University and NBER, United States and CEPR · 3 Graduate School of Business, Columbia University

Abstract

We examine the optimal financing of infrastructure when governments can expropriate rents from private sector firms that manage infrastructure. While private firms need incentives to implement projects well, governments need incentives to limit expropriation. This double moral hazard limits the willingness of outside investors to fund infrastructure projects. Optimal financing contracts involve government guarantees to investors against project failure to incentivize the government to agree not to expropriate, thus improving private sector incentives and project quality. The contract also reflects several other features prevalent in infrastructure financing in practice, among which are government coinvestment, tax subsidies, and development rights.

DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhaf007
Volume
38
Issue
5
Pages
1368-1418
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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