Review of Financial Studies Vol. 24 No. 11 2011
A Model of Portfolio Delegation and Strategic Trading
Abstract
[This article endogenizes information acquisition and portfolio delegation in a one-period strategic trading model. We find that, when the informed portfolio manager is relatively risk tolerant (averse), price informativeness increases (decreases) with the amount of noise trading. When noise trading is endogenized, the linear equilibrium in the traditional literature breaks down under a wide range of parameter values. In contrast, a linear equilibrium always exists in our model. In a conventional portfolio delegation model under a competitive partial equilibrium, the manager's effort of acquiring information is independent of a linear incentive contract. In our strategic trading model, however, a higher-powered linear contract induces the manager to exert more effort for information acquisition.]
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 3778-3812
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib