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Review of Financial Studies Vol. 35 No. 5 2022

Exchange Competition, Entry, and Welfare

Giovanni Cespa1; Xavier Vives2

1 Bayes Business School · 2 IESE Business School

Abstract

We assess the consequences for market quality and welfare of different entry regimes and exchange pricing policies. To do so, we integrate a microstructure model with a free-entry, exchange competition model where exchanges have market power in technological services. Free-entry delivers superior liquidity and welfare outcomes vis-á-vis an unregulated monopoly, but entry can be excessive or insufficient. Depending on the extent of the monopolist’s technological services undersupply compared to the first best, a planner can achieve a higher welfare controlling entry or platform fees. Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming

DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhab101
Volume
35
Issue
5
Pages
2570-2624
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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