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Review of Financial Studies Vol. 34 No. 9 2021

Funding Constraints and Informational Efficiency

Sergei Glebkin; Naveen Gondhi; John Chi-Fong Kuong

INSEAD

Abstract

We analyze a tractable rational expectations equilibrium model with margin constraints. We argue that constraints affect and are affected by informational efficiency, leading to a novel amplification mechanism. A decline in wealth tightens constraints and reduces investors’ incentive to acquire information, lowering price informativeness. Lower informativeness, in turn, increases the risk borne by financiers who fund trades, leading them to further tighten constraints faced by investors. This information spiral leads to (a) significant increases in risk premium and return volatility in crises, when investors wealth declines, (b) complementarities in information acquisition in crises, and (c) complementarities in margin requirements.

DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhaa124
Volume
34
Issue
9
Pages
4269-4322
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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