Review of Financial Studies Vol. 26 No. 10 2013

Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model

Keiichi Hori¹; Hiroshi Osano^2,3

¹ Ritsumeikan University · ² Kyoto University · ³ Institute of Economic Research of the Slovak Academy of Sciences

Abstract

We explore a continuous-time agency model with double moral hazard. Using a venture capitalist (VC)–entrepreneur relationship where the VC both supplies costly effort and chooses the optimal timing of the initial public offering (IPO), we show that optimal IPO timing is earlier under double moral hazard than under single moral hazard. Our results also indicate that the manager's compensation tends to be paid earlier under double moral hazard. We derive several comparative static results, notably that IPO timing is earlier when the need for monitoring by the VC is smaller and when the volatility of cash flows is larger.

DOI

10.1093/rfs/hht027

Volume

26

Issue

10

Pages

2620-2647

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

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