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Review of Financial Studies Vol. 35 No. 12 2022

Conflicting Interests and the Effect of Fiduciary Duty: Evidence from Variable Annuities

Mark Egan1; Shan Ge2; Johnny Tang3

1 Harvard Business School and NBER , USA · 2 Stern School of Business, New York University , USA · 3 Harvard University, USA

Abstract

We examine the variable annuity market to study conflicts of interest and the effect of fiduciary duty in brokerage markets. Insurers typically pay brokers higher commissions for selling more expensive annuities. Our results indicate that sales are four times as sensitive to brokers’ interests as to investors’. To limit conflicts of interest, the Department of Labor proposed a rule in 2016 holding brokers to a fiduciary standard. We find that after the proposal, sales of high-expense products fell by 52% as sales became more sensitive to expenses. Based on our structural estimates, investor welfare improved overall.

DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhac047
Volume
35
Issue
12
Pages
5334-5386
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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